Squaring the CERCLA: Superfund and the Superfund Task Force by Manny Marcos















SQUARING THE CERCLA: 
SUPERFUND AND THE SUPERFUND TASK FORCE 
 




SQUARING THE CERCLA: 







The Superfund Task Force recently released its 
final report on the implementation of its 
recommendations for improving the Superfund 
program. The Task Force was given five goals for 
improving the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(“CERCLA’s”), implementation. These goals are to 
expedite cleanup and remediation, re-invigorate 
responsible party cleanup and reuse, encourage 
foreign investment, promote redevelopment and 
community revitalization, and engage with partners 
and stakeholders. While the Task Force’s 
recommendations have improved CERCLA’s 
implementation, many of CERCLA’s structural flaws 
remain intact. Specifically, CERCLA still has a severe 
shortage of funding, an unfair liability scheme, 
perverse incentives, due process concerns, excessive 
litigation costs for PRPs, and social justice concerns. 
To resolve these flaws, this Note proposes that the 
legislature take legislative and administrative action to 
remove the petroleum exclusion; reimpose and expand 
the superfund taxes; remove CERCLA’s retroactive, 
joint, and several liability scheme; create an 
independent board to evaluate CERCLA liability using 
the gore factors; create an objective and racially just 
NPL-placement policy and fines imposition policy, and 
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On September 9, 2019, the Superfund Task Force released its 
final report on its recommendations for improving CERCLA’s 
implementation.1 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), commonly 
known as Superfund, was enacted to deter parties from releasing 
hazardous substances at sites and to establish a means for the EPA to 
clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites.2 To accomplish these 
goals, CERCLA imposes retroactive, strict, joint, and several liability 
on all potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”).3 Such PRPs include (1) 
current owners or operators of a facility, (2) past owners or operators 
of a facility at the time the hazardous substances were released, (3) 
arrangers who arranged for the disposal or treatment of the hazardous 
substances, and (4) transporters of the hazardous substances.4  
 
CERCLA also grants the EPA the authority to pursue cleanup 
and enforcement actions in response to the release or threatened 
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2
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release of hazardous substances.5 To ensure a site’s cleanup, the EPA 
may pursue either an enforcement action to compel the PRPs to clean 
up the polluted site or a cleanup action to clean up the polluted site 
itself.6 In cleaning up a site, the EPA may use the money collected 
from either the PRPs7 or the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust 
Fund (“Superfund”).8      
          
On May 22, 2017, former EPA administrator E. Scott Pruitt 
formed a Superfund Task Force and gave it thirty days to provide 
recommendations and strategies for improving CERCLA’s 
implementation.9 Specifically, the Task Force was given five goals for 
improving CERCLA’s implementation.10 These five goals are (1) to 
expedite cleanup and remediation, (2) to re-invigorate responsible 
party cleanup and reuse, (3) to encourage foreign investment, (4) to 
promote redevelopment and community revitalization, and (5) to 
engage with partners and stakeholders.11 One month later, the Task 
Force outlined forty-two recommendations for the EPA to pursue to 
achieve these five goals.12 On September 9, 2019, the Task Force 
submitted its final report on the successful implementation of these 
recommendations.13 
  
While these recommendations have improved CERCLA’s 
implementation as evidenced by the Task Force’s final report, many 
of CERCLA’s structural flaws remain intact and will require 
legislative changes to resolve. Specifically, CERCLA still has (a) a 
severe shortage of funding, (b) an unfair liability scheme, (c) perverse 
incentives, (d) due process concerns, (e) excessive litigation costs for 




 42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1)(2012). 
6
 See id. 
7
 42 U.S.C. §9607(a). 
8
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9
 Superfund Task Force Recommendations, EPA.GOV. i, iii (July 25, 
2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
07/documents/superfund_task_force_report.pdf [hereinafter Task Force 
Recommendations]. 
10
 Id. at iv. 
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 Id.  
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 Id. at iv. 
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This Note will explore how the Task Force resolved or failed 
to resolve CERCLA’s many flaws. This Note will also provide its own 
solutions for correcting flaws that the Task Force failed to resolve. 
Unlike the Task Force’s recommendations, many of these solutions 
will require structural changes to CERCLA’s legislative framework. 
Part I of this Note provides an in-depth overview of CERCLA’s 
doctrinal structure and enforcement mechanisms. Part II of this Note 
describes the myriad of flaws inherent in CERCLA’s structure and 
enforcement mechanisms. Part III of this Note explores how the Task 
Force’s recommendations solve or fail to solve many of CERCLA’s 
flaws. Part III also proposes legislative and administrative changes to 
address these structural and surface flaws that the Task Force failed to 
resolve. This Note maintains that these legislative and administrative 
changes to CERCLA are necessary for a more effective, efficient, and 
equitable CERCLA. 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA 
 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), commonly known as 
Superfund, is a hastily drafted statute that is notorious for its vague 
terminology and its confusing legislative history.14 The legislature 
enacted CERCLA to correct the remedial gaps in the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act’s (“RCRA’s”) cradle-to-grave 
program and to establish a means for cleaning up abandoned 
hazardous waste sites.15 To accomplish these two goals, CERCLA 
grants the EPA the authority to pursue cleanup and enforcement 
actions in response to the release or threatened release of a variety of 
hazardous substances.16 Such substances, however, do not include 
petroleum or gas usable for fuel.17   
  
To finance cleanup and enforcement actions and to deter 
prospective polluters, CERCLA imposes retroactive, strict, joint, and 
several liability on all potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”).18 Such 
 
14
 Jeffrey M. Moss, Impact of CERCLA On Real Estate Transactions: 
What Every Owner, Operator, Buyer, Lender, . . . Should Know, 6 BYU J. PUB. 
HEALTH 365, 367 (1992). 
15
 Armstrong, supra note 2. 
16
 See 42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1)(2012). 
17
 42 U.S.C. §9601(14)(2012). 
18
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liability is retroactive because parties may be held liable for acts that 
occurred before CERCLA was enacted, strict because the EPA need 
not prove causation or intent, and joint and several because PRPs may 
be held liable for the entire cost related to a site when the harm cannot 
be apportioned or there are no other solvent PRPs.19    
 
To ensure a site’s cleanup, the EPA may either (1) pursue an 
enforcement action to compel the PRPs to clean up the polluted site or 
(2) pursue a cleanup action to clean up the site itself.20 In cleaning up 
a polluted site, the EPA may use the money collected from either the 
PRPs21 or the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust Fund 
(“Superfund”).22 The Superfund was initially funded by revenues 
derived from special taxes on the chemical and petroleum industries 
and large firms,23 but is now financed almost entirely by the general 
tax revenue, resulting in a precipitous decline in Superfund funding24 
and a slowing down of site completion.25 
 
When cleaning up a site itself, the EPA can pursue two types 
of cleanup actions: removal operations and remedial operations.26 
Removal operations are short-term actions taken by the EPA in 
response to the imminent release or threatened release of hazardous 
substances.27 By contrast, remedial operations are long-term actions 
taken by the EPA to permanently reduce the risk of the release of 
hazardous substances.28 Remedial operations, however, can only be 
taken at places listed on the National Priority List (“NPL”).29 To be 





 42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1). 
21
 42 U.S.C. §9607(a). 
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 42 U.S.C. §96011(a)(2012). 
23
 The Return of the Superfund Tax, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK (June 22, 
2010), https://www.enn.com/articles/41458-the-return-of-the-superfund-tax. 
24
 Jessica Morrison, Polluted Sites Linger Under U.S. Cleanup Program, 






 42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1). 
27
 42 U.S.C. §9601(23)(2012). 
28
 42 U.S.C. §9601(24)(2012). 
29










Assessment / Site Inspection (“PA / SI”).30 If the proposed site is found 
to have significant environmental issues, it is then subject to a 
Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Study (“RI / FS”).31 Once the RI 
/ FS is complete, the EPA conducts a hearing that produces a Record 
of Decision (“ROD”), which sets forth the cleanup plan based on an 
analysis of the RI / FS’s data.32 These cleanup procedures and 
processes are often slow,33 inefficient,34 arbitrary,35 overly 
ambitious,36 expensive,37 and unevenly38 – possibly even inequitably39 
– applied. 
       
CERCLA also grants the EPA the authority to order private 
parties through unilateral administrative orders (“UAOs”) to take 
short-term or long-term cleanup action if there is an imminent, 
substantially dangerous release or threatened release of hazardous 
substances.40 Such UAO’s, however, are not subject to pre-
enforcement review, and parties who refused to comply with these 
UAO’s may incur treble damages for the costs incurred by the 
Superfund due to their noncompliance.41   
        
After PRPs conduct a mandatory cleanup of a site, the PRPs 
can require the EPA to apportion liability to other PRPs through a 
 
30
 42 U.S.C. §9605(4)(d)(2012). 
31




 Robert W. McGee, Superfund: It’s Time for Repeal After a Decade of 
Failure, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165, 168 (1993). 
34
 See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, How Costly Is "Clean"? An 
Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Superfund Site Remediations, 18 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT., 2, 22 (1999). 
35
 See Superfund: The Good, the Bad, and the Broken, FREEDOM WORKS 
(Feb. 27, 1998), https://www.freedomworks.org/content/issue-analysis-70-
superfund-good-bad-and-broken. 
36
 See Richard L. Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut That Failed, PERC 
POL’Y SERIES 1, 7 (May 1996), https://www.perc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/ps5.pdf. 
37
 Mcgee, supra note 33, at 170-71. 
38
 Richard L. Stroup & Bradley Townsend, EPA’s New Superfund Rule: 
Making the Problem Worse, 3 CATO REV. BUS. & GOV’T 72, 73 (1993). 
39
 See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The 
Racial Divide In Environmental Law, A Special Investigation, 15.3 NAT’L L.J, 1, 2 
(Sept. 21, 1992), https://www.ejnet.org/ej/nlj.pdf. 
40
 42 U.S.C. §9606(a)(2012). 
41
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contribution suit.42 PRPs, however, are not subject to contribution 
suits for matters addressed in an EPA settlement.43 Courts hearing 
contribution suits apply the rules of equity to determine whether to 
apportion the harm caused by the pollutants and by what degree to 
apportion it.44 Courts often determine equitability using the Gore 
factors, which take into account (a) the ability of the parties to 
demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge, release, or disposal 
of the hazardous substances can be distinguished, (b) the quantity of 
hazardous substances involved, (c) how toxic the hazardous 
substances are, (d) how involved the parties were in the release of the 
hazardous substances, (e) how careful the parties were with the 
hazardous substances in proportion to their toxicity, and (f) how 
cooperative the parties were with the federal, state, or local officials.45 
Courts hearing contribution suits have the discretion to look at a 
variety of other equitable factors besides the Gore factors.46 
Consequently, private parties who wish to pursue contribution suits 
have difficulty establishing the “correct” apportionment methodology, 
and as such, the results of such contribution suits are unpredictable.47  
 
PRPs may also conduct a voluntary site cleanup and sue other 
PRPs for costs if they conducted the cleanup in accordance with the 
national contingency plan.48 In these cost recovery suits, PRPs can sue 
other PRPs jointly and severally unless a reasonable basis for 
apportioning liability can be established.49 Moreover, PRPs are subject 
to cost recovery for matters already addressed in an EPA settlement.50  
 
42
 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1)(2012). 
43
 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(2)(2012). 
44
 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1). 
45
 Jeffrey M. Gaba, The Private Causes of Action under CERCLA: 
Navigating the Intersection of Sections 107(a) and 113(f), 5 MICH. J. EVNTL. & 
ADMIN. L. 117, 128 n.50 (2015) (citing United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 
F.3d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 466 
(W.D. Okla. 1987); Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of 
Superfund: A Critique of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. EVNTL. 
L.J. 36, 60 (1994)).  
46
 Steven Ferrey, Inverting the Law: Superfund Hazardous Substance 
Liability and Supreme Court Reversal of All Federal Circuits, 33 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 641 (2009). 
47
 See id. 
48
 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(|b)(2012). 
49













In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (“SARA”).51 SARA, among other things, 
requires that the EPA follow all applicable, relevant, and appropriate 
requirements (“ARARs”) when pursuing a cleanup or enforcement 
action.52 Specifically, SARA requires the EPA to take remedial action 
that protects human health and the environment, is cost-effective, and 
meets both federal and local environmental standards.53 SARA also 
requires the EPA to disfavor remedies that entail the offsite transport 
and disposal of hazardous substances.54 Sixteen years after Congress 
enacted SARA, it enacted the Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act (“SBLRBRA”), which, among other 
things, establishes a federal grants program for the development of 
contaminated or potentially contaminated property.55  The SBLRBRA 
also provides incentives for local governments and private parties – 
who can clean up sites more quickly and efficiently than the EPA56 – 
to revitalize such property.57 
 
CERCLA also imposes retroactive, strict, joint, and several 
liability on a broad range of PRPs.58 Such PRPs include (1) current 
owners or operators of a facility, (2) past owners or operators of a 
facility at the time the hazardous substances were released, (3) 
arrangers who arranged for the disposal or treatment of the hazardous 
substances, and (4) transporters of the hazardous substances.59 In 
practical terms, these PRPs can include buyers, sellers, lenders, 
corporate officers, employees, majority shareholders, lessors, lessees, 
 
51
 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2006)). 
52






 42 U.S.C. §9628(a)(2012). 
56
 See John Shanahan, How To Rescue Superfund: Bringing Common 
Sense to the Process, THE HERITAGE FOUND. 1, 6, 9 (July 31, 1995), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/1995/pdf/bg1047.pdf; Stroup, supra note 36, 
at 21. 
57
 42 U.S.C. §9628(a). 
58
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Under CERCLA, current and past owners of a site can be held 
liable for the release of hazardous substances.61 Such parties can 
include buyers, sellers, lessors, successor corporations, trustees, 
executors, corporate officers, and majority shareholders.62 When the 
legislature originally enacted CERCLA, purchasers of polluted 
properties could be held liable for any hazardous substances released 
by prior owners.63 Furthermore, purchasers could still be held liable 
even after they conducted their due diligence and were unaware of any 
released hazardous substances.64 In fact, the only recognizable defense 
parties could claim was for force majeure acts, such as an act of God, 
war, or acts or omissions by third parties who did not have a 
contractual relationship with the defendant.65  
    
In response to the lack of an innocent purchaser defense, 
Congress enacted SARA.66 SARA, among other things, creates a 
defense for land purchasers who comply with a number of challenging 
past and continuing obligations.67 Specifically, SARA creates a 
defense for land purchasers who:  
 
(1) Had no constructive knowledge of any hazardous 
substances on the site at the time of purchase;  
(2) Conducted an “all appropriate inquiry” (“AAI”) by, 




 Moss, supra note 14, at 375-96. 
61
 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(1-2). 
62
 Moss, supra note 14, at 375-96. 
63
 See Paul C. Quinn The EPA Guidance on Landowner Liability and the 
Innocent Landowner Defense: The All Appropriate Inquiry Standard: Fact or 
Fiction, 2 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 143, 149 (1991). 
64




 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2006)). 
67










(3) Exercised appropriate due care with respect to the 
hazardous substances;  
(4) took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions 
of third parties and their foreseeable consequences;  
(5) Fully cooperate with all parties authorize to conduct 
response actions related to the property;  
(6) Complies with any land-use restrictions established or 
relied on in connection with the response action;  
(7) Do not impede the effectiveness or integrity of any 
institutional control employed at the property in 
connection with the response action; and;  
(8) Take reasonable steps to stop or prevent any current or 
future releases and prevent or limit the exposure of any 
human, environmental, or natural resource to any 
released hazardous substance.68  
 
SARA also creates defenses for certain government entities and 
parties who acquired polluted properties by inheritance or bequest.69  
 
Sixteen years after Congress enacted SARA, it enacted the 
SBLRBRA, which, among other things, provides a defense for bona 
fide purchasers who knew about the hazardous substances but acted in 
good faith and fully cooperated with the EPA.70 Specifically, the 
SBLRBRA creates a defense for bona fide land purchasers who:  
 
(1) Purchased the facility after January 11, 2002;  
(2) Established that all disposal of hazardous substances 
took place before the purchaser acquired the facility; 
(3) Conducted an AAI into the prior ownership and uses of 
the facility;  
(4) Provide/ed all legal required notices as to the release of 
any hazardous substances at the facility;  
(5) Were not/is not potentially liable or affiliated with any 
prior owner or operator who is potentially liable for 
response costs at the facility;  
(6) Took/take reasonable steps to stop or prevent any 





 42 U.S.C. §9601(35)(A)(ii-iii). 
70
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(7) Prevent/ed or limit/ed the exposure of any human, 
environmental, or natural resource to any released 
hazardous substance;  
(1) Fully cooperate/ed with and assist/ed all parties 
authorized to conduct response actions or natural 
resource restoration at the facility;  
(2) Comply with any land use restrictions established or 
relied upon in connection with the response action;  
(3) Did/do not impede the effectiveness or integrity of any 
institutional control employed at the property in 
connection with the response action, and;  
(4) Comply/ed with all government subpoenas.71  
 
The SBLRBRA also provides a defense for landowners who own 
properties at risk of becoming contaminated by a nearby polluted 
site.72 To qualify for the contiguous landowner defense, a party must 
have conducted an AAI into the prior ownership and uses of the 
facility, had no constructive knowledge of the nearby contaminated 
site, did not contribute or consent to the release or threatened release 
of the hazardous substances, and complied with a number of 
challenging past and continuing obligations that substantially parallel 
those for the bona fide purchaser defense.73 The SBLRBRA also 
provides a de micromis exemption for transporters and arrangers that 
contributed less than a specified amount of hazardous substances at a 
site.74  
 
If a PRP qualifies for these or other defenses or exemptions 
under CERCLA, the EPA may issue that PRP a comfort/status letter 
stating that it meets the appropriate requirements.75 Such 
comfort/status letters, however, are often non-binding; as such, they 
often do not always provide reasonable assurances to PRPs.76 The 
EPA may also issue comfort/status letters to inform interested parties 









 42 U.S.C. 9607(o)(2012). 
75
 Frona M. Powel, Amending CERCLA to Encouraging the 
Redevelopment of Brownfields: Issues, Concerns, and Recommendations, 53 












reuse of impacted properties.77 Such legal and environmental 
information can include past and present contamination, cleanup 
status, current or potential EPA involvement at the site, and any 
statutory protections or agency policies that may pertain to the 
interested party’s situation.78 The EPA may also administer 
comfort/status letters to suggest reasonable steps that the EPA believes 
a party should take at the property to protect human health and the 
environment.79 
 
B. Operators, Transporters, and Arrangers 
 
Operators are also liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous 
waste under CERCLA.80 An operator is defined in the statute as a party 
that operates – but need not own – a polluting facility.81 Such parties 
can include lenders, corporate officers, employees, majority 
shareholders, lessees, parent corporations, trustees, executors, and 
remediation firms.82 As the legislature failed to define the term 
“operates,” the Supreme Court defined it as managing, directing, or 
conducting operations related to the leakage or disposal of hazardous 
substances or making decisions about compliance with environmental 
regulations.83 
    
By contrast, Congress clarified the participation standard as it 
relates to secured lenders.84 Under CERCLA, secured lenders are 
exempt from liability for polluted sites if they have an ownership 
interest in a site primarily to protect a security interest and do not 
participate in the management of the site.85 To further clarify when a 





 See Memorandum from Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator 
for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Envtl. Protection Agency [EPA] 20 





 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(1). 
81
 42 U.S.C. §9601(20). 
82
 Moss, supra note 14, at 375-96. 
83
 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66–67 (1998) (remanding 
the case for determination as to whether Bestfoods, the parent corporation, might 
be deemed an operator). 
84
 See 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(g). 
85
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Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act 
of 1996 (“ACLLDIPA”).86 Under the ACLLDIPA, a secured lender is 
only held liable for polluted sites if it actually participates in its 
management or operational affairs, as defined extensively in the 
ACLLDIPA.87 As a result of CERCLA’s liability scheme, parties such 
as lenders and parent corporations are perversely incentivized not to 
oversee or involve themselves in the cleanup of sites so as not to be 
held strictly, jointly, and severally liable as an operator. CERCLA also 
imposes liability on (a) transporters who delivered hazardous 
substances to disposal or treatment facilities if they participated in the 
selection of the facility88 and (b) arrangers who arranged for the 
disposal or treatment of hazardous substances if that was the intent of 
their actions.89 
 
II. THE FLAWS OF CERCLA  
    
CERCLA has many flaws. First, the petroleum exclusion is 
inequitable, as CERCLA’s overlap with Section 311 of the Clean 
Water Act and RCRA is imperfect and does not justify the petroleum 
exclusion.90 Indeed, Section 311 of the Clean Water Act only covers 
hazardous spills on navigable waters, and RCRA contains several 
remedial gaps that require CERCLA for correction.91 For example, 
RCRA does not cover past spills that do not present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to humans or the environment.92 
Additionally, the petroleum exclusion decreases funds available for 
site cleanup and further complicates the statute, resulting in money 
being wasted on litigation costs.93  
 
Second, the Superfund is severely underfunded, with funding 







 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4). 
89
 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(3); Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. 
v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (finding that Shell did not intend for spills of 
hazardous waste to occur and therefore was not an arranger as defined by Section 
§9607(a)(3)). 
90




 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). 
93










special taxes.94 As a result, the rate of site completion has slowed 
precipitously, with twenty-five sites completed in 1995, but only one 
site completed in 2016.95 Third, CERCLA’s retroactive, strict, joint, 
and several liability scheme encourages excessive litigation costs, as 
individual PRPs can be held liable for the entire cost related to a site 
and are thus incentivized to fight the EPA in court and sue all PRPs 
for contribution.96 Although these contribution suits allow the EPA to 
shift the burden of suing PRPs onto other PRPs, the excessive 
litigation costs incurred by PRPs due to CERCLA amount to billions 
of dollars in costs.97 Moreover, because CERCLA liability is 
potentially unlimited, insurance companies are reluctant to insure 
PRPs against CERCLA liability, and PRPs, in turn, are reluctant to 
involve themselves in the revitalization of polluted properties.98  
 
Fourth, CERCLA’s retroactive, strict, joint, and several 
liability scheme results in an unfair allocation of financial 
responsibility, as parties who contributed a small amount of waste can 
be held liable for the entire cost related to a site.99 Furthermore, these 
parties can be held entirely liable even if they unknowingly released 
waste at the site prior to CERCLA’s enactment and did not 
independently cause any damage to humans or the environment.100 
Accordingly, PRPs who would have otherwise cleaned up polluted 
sites are hesitant to do so because they can be held liable for the entire 
cost related to a site through the slightest of mistakes.101   
      
Moreover, as Professor Epstein argues, CERCLA’s joint and 
several liability scheme creates collective action problems that 
perversely incentivize PRPs not to voluntarily clean up or reduce their 
waste.102 Indeed, because a PRP can be held entirely liable for 
voluntary cleanup costs and must recapture its expenses through cost 
recovery suits at the end of the site cleanup, it alone bears the initial 
 
94




 See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a-c). 
97
 See Mcgee, supra note 33, at 178. 
98
 See id. at 174-75. 
99
 See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a-c).  
100
 See id. 
101
 See McGee, supra note 33, at 175. 
102
 See Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 
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costs of the site cleanup, while the initial savings are spread out thinly 
to all PRPs.103 Additionally, because it may take decades to complete 
site cleanup and resolve cost recovery suits, it may take that long for 
PRPs to recapture their cleanup costs – some of which will inevitably 
be lost in litigation expenses.104 Moreover, because many PRPs cannot 
reduce their waste to a legally permissible level, any reduction of 
waste by such PRPs is effectively rendered worthless due to 
CERCLA’s joint and several liability scheme.105 Instead, the optimal 
strategy for such PRPs is to reduce their precaution costs and save 
money, as the initial savings that a PRP may earn can be substantial 
while the initial losses that it creates will be borne by other PRPs.106 
Thus, CERCLA’s joint and several liability scheme incentivizes PRPs 
to further pollute sites.107   
   
Fifth, parties such as lenders108 and parent corporations109 are 
perversely incentivized not to oversee or involve themselves in the 
cleanup of polluted sites so as not to be held strictly, jointly, and 
severally liable as an operator.110 As a result, sites are inadequately 
cleaned up, often resulting in the leakage of even more hazardous 
waste.111 Sixth, CERCLA’s innocent purchaser defense, bona fide 
purchaser defense, and contiguous landowner defense are inadequate, 
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as they are merely defenses that must be raised at trial and not 
exemptions; as such, they do not protect the economic and reputational 
interests of PRPs who must still pay legal fees and bear the brunt of 
negative publicity related to the case.112 Moreover, PRPs must meet a 
number of challenging requirements to qualify for and keep these 
defenses and can lose them through the slightest of mistakes.113 As a 
result, parties are hesitant to involve themselves in the revitalization 
of polluted properties.114   
        
Seventh, PRPs are denied due process under CERCLA, as they 
cannot obtain pre-enforcement review for UAOs, which require them 
to take short term or long term cleanup action in response to an 
imminent, substantially dangerous release or threatened release of 
hazardous substances.115 Furthermore, PRPs who refused to comply 
with such orders to remove or remediate hazardous substances may 
incur treble damages for the costs incurred by the Superfund due to 
their noncompliance.116 Moreover, although the PRPs can later sue the 
EPA or other PRPs for cleanup costs, by then the former PRPs are 
already in massive financial distress – sometimes even facing 
bankruptcy – due to high cleanup costs and excessive litigation 
expenses.117 As a result, parties are hesitant to involve themselves in 
the revitalization of polluted sites.118 
      
Eighth, the EPA’s investigation, cleanup, and reuse process is 
slow and inefficient.119 Furthermore, too much time and money are 
wasted on administrative and litigation expenses rather than on actual 
site cleanup.120 Additionally, the EPA is highly conservative in its 
assessment of potential risks and overly ambitious and inflexible in its 
cleanup goals.121 For example, in a sample of 150 NPL sites, 
researchers found the median number of expected cancer cases at the 
 
112
 See Kenneth A. Hodson & Charles H. Oldham, Defenses to Liability 
Under CERCLA, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 459, 462-77 (2013). 
113
 See id. 
114
 See id. 
115




 Stroup, supra note 36, at 9. 
118
 See id. 
119
 McGee, supra note 33, at 166, 168-71. 
120
 Id. at 165, 170.  
121






2021]                              SQUARING THE CERCLA                                        523 
 
 
sites for a thirty-year period was less than 0.1%, and the cost per 
cancer case averted in most sites was over $100 million.122 Likewise, 
the EPA often requires overly stringent groundwater standards at 
cleanup sites where water is not expected to be drunk.123   
 
 Additionally, the EPA does not clean up the most hazardous 
sites first; instead, it gives preference to sites not on the NPL to avoid 
the bureaucracy involved in cleaning up NPL sites.124 Furthermore, 
NPL status does not necessarily correlate with health risk, as the 
ranking system to qualify a site for a place on the NPL is arbitrary; 
some sites on the list may pose little risk to humans and the 
environment, while others not listed may pose more significant 
risks.125 Moreover, the EPA often hires ineffectual contractors to clean 
up sites for inordinate amounts of money, sometimes even paying such 
contractors bonuses.126  
    
 Tenth, the EPA’s remedies are uneven from site to site, often 
driven by community lobbying.127 Such lobbying creates perverse 
incentives for the EPA to impose overly stringent cleanup standards 
on sites to satisfy lobbying parties.128 Conversely, some critics allege 
that unevenness of the EPA’s remedies results in environmental 
injustice towards minority communities because such communities 
have less political clout and are less represented in the government and 
on the boards of polluting companies.129 As a result, these critics allege 
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up in minority communities than in non-minority communities.130 
Moreover, these critics further allege that the EPA imposes lesser fines 
and chooses less permanent treatment solutions in minority-
communities than in non-minority communities.131 Also subject to lax 
enforcement are nonprofit organizations, municipalities, and 
government agencies.132 In fact, the Department of Defense generates 
the most hazardous waste in the country yet is often not asked to pay 
for the costs related to such waste.133   
  
 Eleventh, notwithstanding the EPA’s Brownfields Program, 
the EPA needs to do more to involve local governments134 and private 
actors135 in the cleanup process, as these parties are more accountable 
for the costs, speed, and effectiveness of the site’s cleanup and can 
clean up sites quicker and more efficiently than the EPA. Finally, as 
comfort/status letters are often non-binding, they do not generally 
provide reasonable assurances to PRPs.136 Consequently, involved 
parties are hesitant to rely on such comfort/status letters to purchase, 
sell, lend, or clean up polluted sites, resulting in further economic 
inefficiencies and environmental damage.137  
       
In response to CERCLA’s many flaws, The Superfund Task 
Force was commissioned to provide recommendations on how the 
EPA can improve its implementation of CERCLA.138 Specifically, the 
Task Force was given five goals for improving CERCLA’s 
implementation. These five goals are (1) to expedite cleanup and 
remediation, (2) to re-invigorate responsible party cleanup and reuse, 
(3) to encourage foreign investment, (4) to promote redevelopment 
and community revitalization, and (5) to engage with partners and 
stakeholders.139 To effectuate these five goals, the Task Force outlined 
forty-two recommendations for the EPA to incorporate into its 
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implementation of CERCLA140 These recommendations have already 
begun to be implemented by the EPA, and the Task Force has 
submitted its final report on the successful implementation of these 
recommendations in 2019.141  
 
With the advent of these recommendations, several surface 
problems of CERCLA have been resolved. Nevertheless, the Task 
Force only provided recommendations for improving CERCLA’s 
implementation – not its statutory scheme; as such, many of 
CERCLA’s structural flaws remain intact and will require legislative 
changes to sufficiently resolve. Part III of this Note will analyze how 
the Task Force’s recommendations solve many of CERCLA’s 
problems. Where the Task Force’s recommendations fail to 
sufficiently address such problems, Part III of this Note will provide 
its own solutions for improving CERCLA’s structure and enforcement 
mechanisms. In contrast to the Task Force’s recommendations, the 
solutions set forth in Part III of this Note will often require legislative 
changes to CERCLA’s statutory scheme.  
 
III. HOW THE TASK FORCE ADDRESSED MANY – BUT NOT ALL 
– OF CERCLA’S FLAWS 
 
The Task Force’s recommendations addressed many, but not 
all, of CERCLA’s flaws. First, the Task Force did not address the 
petroleum exclusion, which inequitably exempts one industry from 
CERCLA liability.142 As a result of the petroleum exclusion, less 
funding is available for site cleanup.143 Moreover, the petroleum 
exclusion further complicates the statute, resulting in money being 
wasted on litigation costs.144 To create a more efficient, effective, and 
equitable CERCLA, the legislature must remove the petroleum 
exclusion from CERCLA’s statutory scheme. 
 
Second, the Task Force addressed CERCLA’s lack of 
funding145 by introducing ways for the EPA to spend money more 
efficiently. Specifically, the Task Force recommended, among other 
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things, that the EPA (a) create an administrative review process for 
remedy decisions with an estimated cost of $50 million;146 (b) review 
third-party contracting procedures for large EPA-approved contractors 
and third-party contracts to ensure that contractors operate efficiently 
and are not overpaid;147 (c) use third parties to evaluate optimal 
remediations for polluted sites, with a focus on optimizing remediation 
for complex sites or sites of significant public interest;148 (d) and speed 
up the cleanup process.149 While these recommendations seek to 
remedy CERCLA’s lack of funding, they merely put a bandage on a 
fiscal wound. Indeed, CERCLA’s lack of funding is largely due to 
competition for general tax revenue funds.150 What is needed is not 
merely smarter spending by the EPA, but increased funding for the 
Superfund.  
 
To obtain such increased funding, the legislature must 
reimpose the Superfund taxes on the chemical and petroleum 
industries and large firms. Moreover, the legislature should expand 
these special taxes to include consumer and commercial goods that are 
harmful to the environment when discharged, such as artificial 
detergents and gasoline. The benefits of expanding these special taxes 
are threefold: First, by imposing special taxes on various parties, the 
costs will be spread out thinly and no one party will be forced to bear 
them alone; second, such cost spreading is fair because all parties that 
directly or indirectly benefit from the pollution will be forced to pay 
for its remediation and prevention; and third, imposing these special 
taxes will result in higher prices for environmentally hazardous 
consumer and commercial goods, which will desensitize people from 
buying products and engaging in activities that are harmful to the 
environment. 
 
Third, the Task Force addressed the EPA’s slow, inefficient, 
and inflexible investigation, cleanup, and reuse process151 by 
recommending several changes to the EPA’s standards and 
methodologies. Specifically, the Task Force recommended, among 
other things, that the EPA: 
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(a) Focus resources on deleting or partially 
deleting NPL sites, especially those that require 
immediate and intense attention;152  
(b) Use systematic planning, best management 
practices, remedy optimization,153 and state-of-
the-art technologies to expedite cleanup;154  
(c) Use adaptive management at large or complex 
sites to make cleanup more efficient;155  
(d) Designate one agency to be in charge of site 
cleanup to reduce overlap and duplication;156  
(e) Include time limits, financial limits, and best 
practices for completing RI/FS,157 and;  
(f) Make the groundwater policy less stringent for 
aquifers unlikely to be used for drinking 
water.158 
 
These recommendations will make the EPA’s investigation, 
cleanup, and reuse process quicker, more efficient, and flexible. 
Absent from these recommendations, however, is any suggestion that 
the EPA improve its NPL-placement policy to better correlate with 
actual risks to humans or the environment. Accordingly, the EPA 
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should appoint an independent board of scientists to create a more 
objective NPL-placement policy that better correlates with actual risks 
to humans and the environment. By reforming the NPL-placement 
policy, the EPA will be able to focus its attention on cleaning up and 
remediating its most hazardous sites. 
  
Nevertheless, site cleanup would probably be quicker and 
more efficient if CERCLA was defederalized, as states are more 
accountable than the EPA and are likely to work on local polluted sites 
more efficiently.159 In a defederalized CERCLA, the federal 
government would provide states with the necessary funding; the 
states would have the authority to clean up NPL and non-NPL sites; 
and the EPA would retain emergency cleanup capacity.160 
Realistically, however, the defederalization of CERCLA will probably 
never happen, as the federal government – like any other entity – does 
not cede power easily. As such, the Task Force’s recommendations for 
making site cleanup quicker and more efficient are the best practical 
way to achieve these goals. 
 
Fourth, the Task Force addressed the excessive litigation costs 
incurred by the EPA and PRPs under CERCLA161 by recommending, 
among other things, that the EPA encourage PRPs to reach early 
settlements with the EPA.162 To that end, the Task Force 
recommended that the EPA provide incentives in the form of reduced 
oversight to PRPs who perform timely, quality work under an 
agreement with the EPA.163 Likewise, the Task Force recommended 
that the EPA use enforcement mechanisms such as UAOs as deterrents 
against recalcitrant parties to discourage protracted negotiations.164  
 
Even with these recommendations, CERCLA’s retroactive, 
strict, joint, and several liability scheme ensures that litigation costs 
for PRPs remain extremely high.165 Indeed, as a result of CERCLA’s 
liability scheme, PRPs can be held unfairly liable for all costs related 
to a site even if they unknowingly released hazardous waste at the site 
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prior to CERCLA’s enactment and did not independently cause any 
damage to humans or the environment.166 Thus, PRPs are incentivized 
to fight the EPA in court and sue all parties involved in the pollution 
– however tangentially – for contribution.167 As a result, litigation 
costs incurred by PRPs amount to billions of dollars in costs.168  
 
Furthermore, because CERCLA liability is potentially 
unlimited, insurance companies are reluctant to insure PRPs against 
CERCLA liability, and PRPs, in turn, are reluctant to involve 
themselves in the revitalization of polluted properties.169 Additionally, 
PRPs who would have otherwise cleaned up polluted sites are hesitant 
to do so because they can be held liable for the entire cost related to a 
site through the slightest of mistakes.170 Furthermore, PRPs are 
perversely incentivized not to clean up or reduce their waste because 
they alone bear the initial costs of such efforts, while the initial savings 
earned are spread out thinly to all PRPs.171 Moreover, because many 
PRPs cannot reduce their waste to a legally permissible level, the 
optimal strategy for such PRPs is to reduce precaution costs and save 
money, as the initial savings that a PRP may earn can be substantial 
while the initial losses that it creates will be borne by other PRPs.172  
 
Therefore, to lower litigation costs for PRPs and make 
CERCLA more equitable, efficient, and effective, the legislature 
needs to fundamentally change CERCLA’s liability scheme. 
Specifically, the legislature must do away with CERCLA’s 
retroactive, joint, and several liability for PRPs. Thus, PRPs will only 
be held liable for their portion of the pollution at the time when such 
pollution was illegal. Nonetheless, CERCLA liability should remain 
strict (and several), as it would be very difficult for the EPA to prove 
causation and intent and discharging parties are the least-cost avoiders.  
 
Moreover, to determine a PRP’s proportionate liability under 
CERCLA, the legislature should amend CERCLA to create an 
independent board that would determine a PRP’s proportionate 
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liability by applying the Gore factors. Such determinations should be 
made within a short timeframe and only be reviewable after the 
cleanup is complete to prevent any delays and ensure that the EPA has 
the requisite funds needed for site cleanup. Additionally, PRPs should 
still be liable for treble damages due to non-compliance. Nonetheless, 
PRPs will have fewer due process concerns because CERCLA liability 
will be limited rather than potentially unlimited, and an independent 
board – not the EPA – will determine CERCLA liability. Accordingly, 
PRPs will be less hesitant to involve themselves in the revitalization 
of polluted properties. 
 
Furthermore, contribution suits – though not cost recovery 
suits – will be rendered irrelevant, as PRPs will only be required to 
pay their fair share of the costs related to a site. As such, litigation 
costs for PRPs will be substantially lowered. Moreover, parties such 
as lenders and parent companies will be less hesitant to oversee or 
involve themselves in the cleanup of polluted sites, as they will only 
be held liable for their share of the pollution. Thus, site cleanup will 
be more effective and efficient.  
 
Additionally, insurance companies will be less hesitant to 
insure private parties against CERCLA liability, who, in turn, will be 
less hesitant to involve themselves with polluted properties. 
Furthermore, PRPs will be less incentivized to fight the EPA in court 
because they will no longer be potentially liable for the entire cost 
related to a site. As a result, litigation costs for PRPs will be lowered. 
Additionally, PRPs will be incentivized to reduce their pollution and 
thereby reduce their proportional liability under CERCLA. Moreover, 
PRPs will no longer be incentivized to reduce their precaution costs 
and not conduct voluntary cleanups because of collective action 
dynamics.  
 
Even with these positive changes, the EPA will likely have less 
money to spend on site cleanup because:  
 
(a) PRPs will no longer be held liable for pollution 
occurring prior to CERCLA’s enactment;  
(b) the EPA will have to pay for the cleanup of orphan 
shares arising from insolvent parties;  
(c) the EPA will incur substantially more litigation costs 
because it will no longer be able to sue a single PRP 






2021]                              SQUARING THE CERCLA                                        531 
 
 
(d) the EPA will no longer be able to sue PRPs who 
minimally contributed to the site pollution because the 
cost of such litigation would exceed the EPA’s ultimate 
recovery; and;  
(e) PRPs will have less incentive to ensure that other 
parties do not discharge waste because they can no 
longer be held liable for a disproportionate amount of 
the costs. 
 
Nevertheless, the legislature can counterbalance this loss of 
Superfund funding by removing the petroleum exclusion and 
imposing special taxes on the chemical and petroleum industries, large 
firms, and consumer and commercial goods that result in harm to the 
environment. Moreover, the EPA can further ensure that the 
Superfund has adequate funding by aggressively pursuing polluters 
and employing CERCLA more efficiently. Accordingly, to make 
CERCLA more equitable, efficient, and effective, the legislature 
should remove CERCLA’s retroactive, joint, and several liability 
scheme.  
     
Fifth, the Task Force addressed the EPA’s uneven173 – and 
possibly inequitable174 – application of remedies from site to site by 
recommending that the EPA review all remedy review and approval 
authorities, especially for polluted sites exceeding $50 million in 
costs, to promote consistent remedy standards across the nation.175 By 
ensuring consistent national standards, the EPA will no longer be 
influenced to impose overly stringent cleanup standards on particular 
sites due to community lobbying, and there will be fewer racial justice 
concerns regarding the EPA’s remedy selection from site to site.  
   
In addition to this, allegations of racial injustice run deeper 
than what is solvable by the meager remedies selected by the EPA. In 
particular, the Task Force’s recommendations do not address the 
allegations that the EPA takes longer to place sites on the NPL list in 
minority communities than in non-minority communities.176 Nor do 
the Task Force’s recommendations address the allegations that the 
EPA imposes lesser fines on polluters in minority communities than 
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in non-minority communities.177 To address these allegations, the EPA 
must conduct a thorough review of its NPL-placement policy and its 
fines imposition policy to better promote consistent standards across 
the nation. 
 
Sixth, the Task Force addressed the EPA’s lack of CERCLA 
enforcement against municipalities and government agencies178 by 
recommending that the EPA engage with local and federal agencies 
and authorities in various ways. Specifically, the Task Force 
recommended, among other things, that the EPA (a) work with federal 
agencies to create policy changes that promote early decision-making 
by federal agencies concerning settlement negotiations;179 (b) use 
comfort/status letters to address liability concerns of local 
governments;180 and (c) issue policy guidance clarifying the EPA’s 
position on the liability of local governments that acquire 
contaminated property.181  
 
While these recommendations encourage the EPA to engage 
with municipalities and government agencies rather than merely 
letting them off the hook, it does not address the EPA’s lack of 
CERCLA enforcement against nonprofit organizations. Accordingly, 
the EPA must engage with nonprofit organizations in a similar way to 
how they did with municipalities and government agencies. In this 
way, the EPA can implement CERCLA against nonprofit 
organizations while at the same time working to engage with these 
organizations as much as possible. 
 
Seventh, the Task Force recommended that the EPA further 
involve local governments and private actors in the cleanup process.182 
Specifically, the Task Force recommended, among other things, that 
the EPA (a) designate tribal, state, or local entities as leads on sites;183 
(b) create and maintain an informational website to aid third-party 
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cleanup and reuse;184 and (c) identify new tools and approaches to 
support third parties interested in cleaning up and reusing sites.185  
 
These recommendations will substantially help the EPA 
further involve local governments and private actors in the cleanup 
process. As a result, polluted sites will be cleaned up more cheaply, 
quickly, and efficiently. Moreover, because the defederalization of 
CERCLA is nearly impossible, these recommendations are the best 
practical way for the EPA to involve local governments and private 
actors in the cleanup process. 
 
Finally, the Task Force addressed the inadequacies of the 
innocent purchaser defense, bona fide purchasers defense, and 
contiguous landowner defense186 by recommended that the EPA 
provide further assurances to prospective purchasers using site-
specific tools.187 Specifically, the Task Force recommended that the 
EPA expand its use of comfort/status letters and binding prospective 
purchase agreements to provide reasonable assurances to prospective 
purchasers to limit their liability.188 Moreover, to ensure that 
comfort/status letters provide reasonable assurances to prospective 
purchasers and PRPs, the Task Force recommended that the EPA 
revise its model comfort/status letters to provide for stronger 
statements addressing potential liability concerns.189 As a result of 
these recommendations, prospective purchasers will no longer have to 
rely on defenses that do not adequately protect them and that are 
difficult to comply with. Moreover, prospective purchasers and PRPs 
will be more willing to rely on comfort/status letters and involve 
themselves in the revitalization of polluted properties, resulting in 
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providing recommendations for how the EPA could expedite cleanup 
and remediation, re-invigorate responsible party cleanup and reuse, 
encourage foreign investment, promote redevelopment and 
community revitalization, and engage partners and stakeholders.190 As 
evidence by the Task Force’s final report, these recommendations 
have improved CERCLA’s implementation.191 Nonetheless, many 
structural and surface flaws remain. Indeed, CERCLA still has: 
  
(a) A severe shortage of funding;  
(b) An unfair liability scheme;  
(c) Perverse incentives;  
(d) Due process concerns;  
(e) Excessive litigation costs for PRPs, and;  
(f) Social justice concerns.  
 
Accordingly, more reform is needed to make CERCLA more efficient, 
fair, and effective.  
 
To create a more efficient, fair, and effective CERCLA, the 
EPA and the legislature should pursue legislative and administrative 
action to:  
 
(1) Remove the petroleum exclusion;  
(2) Reimpose and expand the Superfund taxes;  
(3) Remove CERCLA’s retroactive, joint, and several 
liability scheme;  
(4) Create an independent board to evaluate CERCLA 
liability using the Gore factors;  
(5) Create an objective and racially just NPL-placement 
policy and fines imposition policy, and;  
(6) Engage with nonprofit organizations.  
 
By making these legislative and administrative changes, the EPA and 
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